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Universal Service Obligation: 
Findings/Concerns and Way 
Forward
Perceived Access Gaps
70% of population is rural: Low per capita GDP 
USD 638 (USD 352 in rural areas)
PCGDP holds higher teledensity potential
5000 urban agglomerates: Mobile coverage 
50%
Current ARPU’s/EBITDA’s inadequate to fund 
capex required
Operator can make profits at ARPU as low as $5
Perceived Access Gaps
Urban teledensity 31 vs. rural teledensity 2
Roll out obligations failed 
Rural DELs installed by incumbent through 
license fees relief: reliance on a dominant 
carrier not the most efficient way 
Additional investments: mobilized through 
intervention, Equity and Efficiency arguments
Rural demand stronger than revealed in the 




Any member of the WTO has the right to define the kind of universal service 
obligation it wishes to maintain. Such obligations will not be regarded as anti-
competitive per se, provided they are administered in a transparent, non-
discriminatory and competitively neutral manner and are not more burdensome than 
necessary for the kind of universal service defined by the member
Questions we address:
(1)whether the current USO scheme created the 
least possible distortion to an otherwise well-
functioning market, and 
(2) whether it provided a level playing field for 
operators bidding in an auction to receive the 
USO subsidy
Findings
Transparent multi-layered reverse bidding 
process
USD 8 billion to be collected USD 4 billion 
disbursed
Significant lowering of benchmark subsidy 
RDELs: rates down to 65 to 70% 
Incumbent won almost 75 percent of auctions 
BSNL (1267 SDCAs), Reliance Infocom Ltd (203 
SDCAs), Tata Teleservices (172 SDCAs), Tata
Teleservices (Maharsashtra 43 SDCAs) 
Concerns
Benefits from using auctions: difficult to have 
sufficient participants bidding against the 
incumbent
Incumbent in an advantageous position bidding 
against operators relying on transfer or lease 
of assets from their competitor 
Tend to be used by market players to extract 
too many concessions
Important strategic implications: effect the way 
firms compete against each other
Concerns
Restricted participation to already existing 
phone companies: left huge rents for the 
incumbent 
Did not maintain incentives for competing 
networks and/or technologies
Asymmetry of information between the 
incumbents and new entrants
Concerns
Auction design disregarded commercial, legal 
and regulatory implications of the fact that the 
incumbent had a fair amount of network 
Can affect the viability of the existing operators 
as well as the entry process in those areas; 
reduces entry
Way Forward
Sustainability of universal service: remove regulatory 
barriers to competition
A liberal minimalist licensing regime: Entry of more firms 
sine qua non of universal service
High endogenous cost of doing business: license fee and 
regulatory levies
Effective, non-discriminatory access regime for sharing 
of backbone: Special Obligations counterbalance its 
market power; Sunk cost arguments
Separation of the transport layers (physical and logical) 
from the higher layers (applications and content) 
Way Forward
Spectrum Assignment and Pricing
Maximise development of all technologies and 
services
Avoid a subsidy laden universal service 
programme
Public finding of backbone networks assurance 
of open access to those networks 
Sound regulatory design and competition 
cornerstone of universal service
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